the ICR and the IMP. shall develop a process to provide a transition plan for hand -over of. IMP security responsibilities overtime. The IMP. Ahtisarijev plan je dinamit za ceo svet! # AM – 28 Mar. Međutim, na kraju EU je ključ. Ahtisarijev plan predviđa slanje specijalnog predstavnika sa velikim brojem članova osoblja da koordinira civilno.
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Belgrade and Pristina need to explain, in detail, what the agreement means for northern Kosovo. How to Get U. The first sentence is silent as to who shall legislate the statute: Pristina would surely reject such a law and see it as an insult; yet it would leave the North no legal avenue to keep rejecting integration into the Kosovo system.
Download pdf to continue reading the full report. Both sides can feel cheated, and Belgrade especially tends to squeal when implementation begins on terms that were only implied in the text itself.
Sukob Srba i KPS-a na protestima
The cost, however, is steep. Ahtisarijef Read Edit View history. Northerners can easily boycott or sabotage all of those measures and probably remain confident that Pristina would stick to its positions.
It is too soon to try to say what it all means.
Ahtisaari Plan – Wikipedia
Yet the thaw in Belgrade-Pristina relations is still fragile and easy to reverse. There is no point holding elections without significant local support. Retrieved 6 January Hide Footnote with a large arsenal ranging from community pressure and civil disobedience to organised boycotts, intimidation and occasional pitched battles.
Archived copy as title Webarchive template wayback links. Vreme je da se ovo shvati i da se deluje.
TransConflict » Ahtisaarijev plan i sever Kosova
Time for a Modest Deal: The first is that the Serbian government has given up on keeping northern Kosovo in its system and has ceded its authority to Pristina.
Retrieved from ” https: The North is thinking of three options. Concluding that there was no chance for the two sides to reconcile their positions, Ahtisaari said he intended to submit to the UN Security Council his proposed status recommendations, including an explicit recommendation for the status outcome itself, by the end of March. It is a kind of de facto recognition of Kosovo and that may be its greatest long-term significance.
Whatever else happens, it is easier today to imagine that Serbia may one day formally recognise the independence of its former province. In Pristina, Kosovo Albanian leaders issued a statement after meeting with Ahtisaari saying they are “convinced that the international process for the resolution of Kosovo’s status led by President Ahtisaari will be concluded soon with Kosovo becoming an independent state.
These steps would bundle the local population and their leaders into a loose Kosovo jacket that could be ahfisarijev over time as tempers cool.
Kosovo wants to defer forming the Association until the OSCE organises local elections; supervise the transfer of security officials; and dissolve the Serbian court and staff a new Kosovo court. But they do not know how to fight Belgrade. It can declare independence, with an aim of negotiating a better deal with one or both of the states that claim it.
One ironic component of this story is that Serbia will probably be tacitly encouraged to violate its own laws by the EU to make all this work, as doing it properly — amending all the relevant legislation and regulation — would take much longer than Brussels prefers. Consider the second point: One or both may have to amend their constitutions. The differences are in emphasis and symbolism, emotionally powerful but with modest practical implications.